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THE DOUBTFUL VALIDITY OF VICTIM-SPECIFIC LIBEL LAWS
NAT STERN*

F

IFTEEN years after the Supreme Court's decision in R.A. V v. City of St.
Paul,' the logic and meaning of the Court's opinion continues to stir
dispute. The Court's invalidation of St. Paul's Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance has left a long trail of scholarly debate over the significance of the
Court's holding. The Court itself has contributed to the controversy by
issuing two decisions that repudiated what some regarded as presumptive
2
implications of R.A.V.
Curiously, the actual impact of R.A. V. in the courts has not been substantial. While R.A. V and its principal sequels have generated ongoing
commentary, relatively few statutes have fallen victim to the authority of
R.A.V's general proscription of selective bans within unprotected categories of speech. In particular, the application of R.A. V's potentially expansive principle to targeted defamation laws has gained little notice among
courts or even otherwise voluble commentators. This lack of attention has
occurred notwithstanding the R.A.V Court's reliance on a hypothetical
3
libel law for a prominent illustration of its central principle.
This article addresses how R.A.V might be invoked to overturn laws
that single out for adverse treatment defamation of certain classes of persons. After describing R.A.V's reasoning and the grounds on which it was
distinguished in subsequent cases, part I reviews reaction to R.A.V in the
academy and the courts. 4 Part II then examines, against the backdrop of
the Court's defamation jurisprudence, the general nature of the limitations that R.A. V might impose on libel laws. 5 Part III explores the susceptibility of particular libel statutes to challenges under R.A.V 6
* John W. and Ashley E. Frost Professor of Law, Florida State University
College of Law. Research for this Article was supported by a grant from Florida
State University. Shannon Doheny and Rachelle-Marie Gentner provided valuable
research assistance.
1. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
2. See generally Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003); Wisconsin v. Mitchell,
508 U.S. 476 (1993). For a further discussion of these two cases, see infra notes 3750 and accompanying text.
3. See R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 384 (using hypothetical to show flaw in "all-or-nothing-at-all approach to first amendment protection").
4. For a further discussion of the Court's reaction to R.A.V, see infra notes 779 and accompanying text.
5. For a further discussion of the limitations of libel laws, see infra notes 80152 and accompanying text.
6. For a further discussion of the susceptibility of libel statutes, see infra notes
153-233 and accompanying text.

(533)

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2007

1

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 4

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

I.

THE CLOUDY LEGACY OF

[Vol. 52: p. 533

R.A.V

R.A. V represents the modification of one longstanding First Amendment doctrine by an even more fundamental principle of free speech. On
the one hand, the Court has traditionally regarded certain categories of
speech, like obscenity, 7 as undeserving of ordinary First Amendment protection because they have scant value and can inflict various harms. 8 On
the other hand, the Court's insistence on the state's obligation of neutrality under the Free Speech Clause has led it repeatedly to strike down laws
deemed improperly discriminatory. 9 The R.A.V Court addressed this tension by extending the prohibition on content-based restrictions to regulation of unprotected categories that it considers overly partisan. The
qualified and ambiguous nature of the Court's opinion, however, did not
comprehensively resolve the scope of government power to selectively regulate proscribable speech. Moreover, the Court's later decisions in Wisconsin v. Mitchell1° and Virginia v. Black"' only partly clarified the extent to
which R.A. V's conception of the First Amendment bars restriction of subclasses of unprotected expression.
A.

RA. V 's Ban on Underinclusiveness and Its Limits

The unprotected speech addressed in R.A. V fell into the category
that gave rise to the Court's original formulation of the "two-level" the7. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (finding obscene material
unprotected by First Amendment).
8. The classic articulation of this approach to "low-value" speech appears in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), where the Court explained
that such categories lie outside the aegis of the First Amendment because they are
"no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed
by the social interest in order and morality." Id. at 572; see also Cass R. Sunstein,
Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. CHi. L. REV. 795, 803 (1993) (distinguishing between
low-value and high-value speech). Chaplinsky itself involved the proscribable category of "fighting words." See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573 (describing category of
speech proscribed by statute). Since Chaplinsky, the Court has specifically determined that the danger and meager societal value of, inter alia, defamation, incitement to imminent illegal action, false or misleading commercial speech and child
pornography make them susceptible to restrictions from which more highly valued
speech is immune. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-63 (1982) (child
pornography); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 770-73 (1976) (false or misleading commercial speech); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (defamation); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (incitement).
9. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989) (finding state statute
overly discriminatory because every flag burning does not necessarily have potential to cause breach of peace); Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-98
(1972) (explaining ordinance's viewpoint discrimination problem); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (discussing constitutional background of Free
Speech Clause).
10. 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
11. 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
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3
ory 1 2 of speech in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire viz., "fighting words."

The defendant had been convicted of violating St. Paul's Bias-Motivated
Crime Ordinance by burning a cross on the lawn of an African-American
family. 14 Under the ordinance, the display of a burning cross or other
symbol constituted a misdemeanor where its predictable effect was to
"[arouse] anger, alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of race, color,
creed, religion or gender .... -15 While the scope of the ordinance made
it susceptible to challenge on overbreadth grounds, 16 the Court avoided
that issue by accepting the Minnesota Supreme Court's construction that
the ordinance reached only expression qualifying as "fighting words"
17
under Chaplinsky.
Nevertheless, Justice Scalia's opinion for the majority found that the
ordinance ran afoul of the First Amendment principle that "[c]ontentbased regulations are presumptively invalid." 18 Justice Scalia acknowledged that since Chaplinsky, the Court had condoned restrictions on the
content of certain classes of speech under a "limited categorical approach."' 19 Still, he disavowed any literal reading of earlier Court pronouncements to the effect that such classes enjoy no recognition at all
under the First Amendment. 20 Properly understood, those passages
meant that these areas of speech could be regulated "because of their constitutionally proscribablecontent,"2 ' conversely, the state cannot make them "vehicles for content discrimination unrelated to their distinctively
22
proscribable content."
In the eyes of the Court, St. Paul's ordinance represented just such a
vehicle. Rather than forbid "fighting words" whatever their nature, St.
Paul had confined its ban to fighting words directed to "one of the speci12. See Tom Hentoff, Speech, Harm, and Self-Government: Understandingthe Ambit
of the Clear and PresentDanger Test, 91 COLUM. L. Rv. 1453, 1462-63 (1991) (discussing development of two-level theory); Harry Kalven,Jr., The Metaphysics of the Law of
Obscenity, 1960 SuP. CT. REv. 1, 10-12 (1960) (discussing complexity of two-level
theory).
13. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
14. See LA.V v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 379-80 (1992) (stating facts of
case).
15. Id. at 380.
16. See id. at 397, 411-14 (White,J., concurring) (arguing that statute could be
invalidated on overbreadth grounds).
17. See id. at 381 (accepting Minnesota Supreme Court's finding that ordinance reaches only "fighting words").
18. See id. at 382 (discussing parameters of government's power to proscribe
speech under First Amendment).
19. See id. at 382-83 (explaining Court's categorical approach to First Amendment cases).
20. See id. at 383 (stating that earlier Court pronouncements limiting First
Amendment protection for certain categories of speech must be "taken in
context").
21. Id. at 383.
22. Id. at 383-84.
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fled disfavored topics."12 3 The First Amendment, however, did not allow
the city to single out for punishment those speakers who "express views on
disfavored subjects." 24 Furthermore, in addition to its facial content discrimination, the ordinance was characterized as functionally discriminatory by viewpoint as well. 2 5 As a practical matter, the Court asserted, the
ordinance deprived bigots of a natural part of their verbal arsenal while
allowing opposing champions of tolerance and equality their full complement. 2 6 By targeting fighting words that "communicate messages of racial,
gender, or religious intolerance," the city had raised the unacceptable pos27
sibility that it sought to "handicap the expression of particular ideas."
While objecting to St. Paul's ordinance, the Court did not condemn
all content discrimination within categories of proscribable speech.
Rather, the Court identified three exceptions to its suspicion that content
discrimination may represent an attempt to exclude certain viewpoints
from the marketplace of ideas. First, the Court would exempt content
discrimination whose justification "consists entirely of the very reason that
the entire class of speech is proscribable .... ',28 For example, the Court
expressed approval of the federal statute criminalizing threats of violence
against the President, because the reasons for withholding First Amendment protection from threats of violence "have special force" in the case
of the President. 29 In addition, the Court placed its imprimatur on laws
aimed at the content of proscribable speech whose goal is to curb the
"secondary effects" peculiarly associated with that content: e.g., a ban only
on obscene live performances that involve minors. 30 Finally, the Court
recognized what is frequently referred to as the catch-all exception. 3 1 This
23. See id. at 391 (finding that St. Paul ordinance violated First Amendment
because it discriminated against disfavored topics).
24. See id. (invalidating ordinance for impermissible content discrimination).
25. See id. at 391 (invalidating ordinance for impermissible viewpoint
discrimination).
26. See id. at 391-92 (finding that St. Paul could not enact rule favoring one
side of debate over another). As an example, the Court contrasted the immunity
under the ordinance of "a sign saying... that all 'anti-Catholic bigots' are misbegotten" with the prohibition of a similar sign about "'papists'"; only the latter
would "insult and provoke violence 'on the basis of religion.'" Id.
27. Id. at 393-94.
28. Id. at 388.
29. See id. (discussing prohibition on threats of violence to the President);
Steven G. Gey, What if Wisconsin v. Mitchell Had Involved Martin Luther King, Jr.?
The Constitutional Flaws of Hate Crime Enhancement Statutes, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
1014, 1032 (1997) (explaining how threats to President "are accompanied by
graver consequences and generate far more social costs than ordinary threats").
30. See R.A.V, 505 U.S. at 389.
31. See id. at 390 (explaining catch-all exception); see, e.g., Gey, supra note 29,
at 1033 (discussing hate crime enhancement statutes); Heidi Kitrosser, Containing
Unprotected Speech, 57 FLA. L. REv. 843, 889 (2005) (examining Court's analysis of
catch-all exception).
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exception permits content discrimination whose nature "is such that there
32
is no realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot.
Having qualified for none of these exceptions, St. Paul's ordinance
was subject to the strict scrutiny triggered by "the 'danger of censorship'
presented by a facially content-based statute." 33 The Court rejected the
argument that the ordinance's targeted prohibitions were necessary to
achieve a compelling interest, since the city could accomplish any permissible purpose by a wholesale ban on fighting words. 3 4 By contrast, the
only distinctive interest embodied in the challenged ordinance was "displaying the city council's special hostility towards the particular biases thus
singled out."'35 Pursuing this goal through content discrimination against
exponents of these biases, the Court ruled, is "precisely what the First
36
Amendment forbids."
The emphatic dismissal of St. Paul's ordinance generated immediate
concern that R.A.V's rationale could be invoked to strike down "hate
crime" laws. 37 The Court soon dispelled this concern in Wisconsin v. Mitchell,38 however, by sustaining a statute that enhanced the penalty for certain
offenses when the defendant "[i]ntentionally selects the person against
whom the crime... is committed... because of the race, religion, color,

disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry of that person . .."39 In a notably brief and unanimous opinion, the Court distinguished St. Paul's restriction of speech governed by First Amendment
principles from Wisconsin's regulation of conduct. 40 Unlike St. Paul's
perceived attempt to hinder the expression of an unpopular view, Wisconsin was credited with seeking to respond to the heightened individual and
societal harms thought to result from hate crimes. 41 Nor did introducing
evidence of a defendant's beliefs to show the bigotry that inspired his
32. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 390.
33. Id. at 395.
34. See id. at 395-96 (finding that St. Paul did not have compelling interest to
justify content discrimination).
35. Id. at 396.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g.,
Frederick M. Lawrence, Resolving the Hate Crimes/Hate Speech Paradox: PunishingBias Crimes and Protecting Racist Speech, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 673,
680 (1993) (arguing that R.A. V's potential to halt prosecution of hate crimes is
"not constitutionally mandated"); Eric David Rosenberg, Hate Crimes, Hate Speech
and Free Speech-Florida'sBias-Intended Crime Statute, 17 NovA L. REv. 597, 611-13
(1992) (discussing "hate crime-free speech trap" that became widespread after
R.A.V.); Philip Weinberg, R.A.V. and Mitchell: Making Hate Crime a Trivial Pursuit,
25 CONN. L. REv. 299, 306-07 (1993) (arguing that R.A.V. "will disarm any state
attempts to deal with racist violence").
38. 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
39. See id. at 480-81, 490 (stating holding of Court).
40. See id. at 487-88 (finding that Wisconsin's statute was "aimed at conduct
unprotected by the First Amendment").
41. See id. (discussing individual and societal harm that results from bias-motivated crimes).
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crime violate the First Amendment; rather, the Court observed that criminal offenses commonly include motive as an element that the state must
42
demonstrate.
A decade later, in Virginia v. Black,4 3 the Court had occasion to interpret one of the exceptions that R.A. V. had carved out from its general
prohibition of content discrimination. Black involved a Virginia statute
making it illegal for someone "with the intent of intimidating any person... to burn.., a cross on the property of another, a highway or other
public place." 44 A patchwork of opinions45 resulted in the invalidation of
the statute, but only because seven justices objected to its provision deeming cross burning in these venues as prima facie evidence of an intent to
intimidate. 46 A separate coalition comprising a majority of justices, however, found that absent the problematic evidentiary provision, the statute
would constitute a valid restriction under R.A.V.'s exception for laws in
which "the basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of the very
reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable .... ,,47 The rele-

vant class in this instance was intimidation, which the Court identified as a
species of the proscribable category of "true threats. '48 The Court held
that Virginia could forbid cross burnings done with intent to intimidate in
light of cross burning's long and pernicious history of impending violence. 49 Thus, the state was entitled to outlaw this type of intimidation,
rather than all intimidating messages, because burning a cross is a "partic50
ularly virulent form of intimidation."
B.

The R.A.V. Trilogy: Reaction and Continued Authority

Commentary on R.A.V. and the two major decisions testing its reach
has focused principally on three questions: (1) the cogency of the R.A. V
Court's reasoning, (2) the degree to which Mitchell and Black can be reconciled with R.A.V, and (3) R.A.V.'s potential effect on other regulatory re42. See id. at 489-90 (explaining that speech can be used to establish motive
and intent).
43. See generally 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
44. Id. at 348.
45. See W. Wat Hopkins, Cross Burning Revisited: What the Supreme Court Should
Have Done in Virginia v. Black and Why It Didn't, 26 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
269, 301-03 (2004) (providing synopsis of individual opinions).
46. See Black, 538 U.S. at 363-68 (finding that prima facie evidence provision

of statute had potential to prosecute and chill protected conduct); id. at 384-87
(Souter, J., concurring in part) (stating that prima facie evidence provision prevented statute from satisfying requirement that no official suppression of ideas was

afoot).
47. Id. at 361 (quoting R.A.V.v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992)); see
id. at 368-70 (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (describing effect of prima facie evidence provision).
48. See id. at 359-60 (discussing true threats).
49. See id. at 363 (finding cross burning with intent to intimidate is proscribable under First Amendment).

50. See id. (explaining history of cross burning).
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gimes. The literature has been marked largely by criticism of the Court's
opinions and uncertainty about their extension. Still, the Court has displayed no willingness to retreat from its approach to this area.
In a sense, R.A.V.'s imposition of limits on the ability to regulate proscribable speech was not startling. Even prior to the decision, the orthodox
version of the two-level theory of speech had undergone considerable erosion. Commercial speech, once on the roster of categories ineligible for
First Amendment recognition, 51 had been granted substantial protec53
tion. 52 Defamation, though still afforded no constitutional protection,
had been accorded a significant measure of "strategic protection" in order
to protect "speech that matters." 54 Even the concept of fighting words,
though still outside the cloak of First Amendment protection, had been
interpreted so narrowly as to raise doubts about its vitality as a meaningful
concept.

55

Nevertheless, the R.A.V. Court's disapproval of content discrimination within proscribable categories, like fighting words, provoked widespread scholarly criticism. While Professor Tribe 56 and others57 have
51. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (finding that First
Amendment protections do not apply to commercial speech), overruled by Va. State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
52. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 646-47
(1985) (permitting attorney to "[solicit] legal business through printed advertising
containing truthful and nondeceptive information and advice regarding the legal
rights of potential clients"); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 n.9 (1980) (noting that Court "review[s] with special
care regulations that entirely suppress commercial speech in order to pursue a
nonspeech-related policy"); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 764-70 (analyzing
benefits and drawbacks of banning pharmacists from advertising price of prescription drugs and concluding that "commercial speech, like other varieties, is
protected").
53. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (noting that
"there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact").
54. See id. at 341-42 (explaining that "to define the proper accommodation
between [freedom of speech and press and protection of those victims of defamation], [the Court has] been especially anxious to assure to the freedoms of speech
and press that 'breathing space' essential to their fruitful exercise" (quoting
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963))). For an overview of the Court's libel
jurisprudence, see infra notes 80-122 and accompanying text.
55. See Donald A. Downs, Skokie Revisited: Hate Group Speech and the First
Amendment, 60 NoTE DAME L. REV. 629, 632-37 (1985) (discussing Supreme
Court's alteration of fighting words doctrine in 1960s and 1970s); Nadine Strossen,
Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DuKE L.J. 484, 509-11
(1990) (surveying Supreme Court's development of fighting words doctrine).
56. See Laurence H. Tribe, The Mystery of Motive, Private and Public: Some Notes
Inspired by the Problems of Hate Crime and Animal Sacrifice, 1993 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 8-11
(1993) (distinguishing statute in Mitchell from ordinance in R.A.V).
57. See, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, A Brief Comment on PoliticallyIncorrect Speech in
the Wake of R.A.V., 47 SMU L. REv. 9, 21-22, 22 n.73 (1993) ("R.A.V teaches us that
the government may not regulate fighting words based on hostility toward the underlying message expressed."); George G. Size & Glenn R. Britton, Is There Hate
Speech? R.A.V. and Mitchell in the Context of FirstAmendment Jurisprudence,21 OHIo
N.U. L. REv. 913, 913, 924-26 (1995) (arguing that "R.A.V [is an] example[ ] of a
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written approvingly on the decision, many have attacked the Court's approach to hate speech laws harshly. 58 Even a recent sympathetic observer
offered an alternative to the R.A.V Court's rationale for scrutinizing content-based regulations of unprotected speech. 5 9 By contrast, numerous
commentators applauded Mitchel460 indeed, persons other than legal academics expressed the relatively little criticism. 6 1 Critics and supporters
larger genera of First Amendment analysis"); Ronald Turner, Hate Speech and the
First Amendment: The Supreme Court's R.A.V. Decision, 61 TENN. L. REv. 197, 222
(1993) ("[E]ven under R.A.V, the government may constitutionally draw a line
banning fighting words for purportedly neutral and reasonable justifications.").
58. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the MissingAmendments: R.A.V. v. City
of St. Paul, 106 HLv. L. REv. 124, 124 (1992) (questioning Supreme Court's constitutional analysis in R.A.V); G. Sidney Buchanan, The Hate Speech Case: A Pyrrhic
Victory for Freedom of Speech?, 21 HOESTRA L. REv. 285, 296-98 (1992) (criticizing
Justice Scalia's opinion in R.A.V.); Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Colored Speech: Cross Burnings, Epistemics, and the Triumph of the Crits?, 93 GEO. L.J. 575, 575-78 (2005) (discussing inconsistencies between R.A.V. and Virginia v. Black); David Goldberger,
Hate Crime Laws and Their Impact on the FirstAmendment, 1992 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 569,
573-79 (1992) (characterizing R.A. V. as "abandon [ing] a firmly established judicial
view that there are two categories of speech. . . ."); Charles R. Lawrence III, Crossburning and the Sound of Silence: Antisubordination Theory and the First Amendment, 37
VILL. L. REv. 787, 787-804 (1993) (callingJustice Scalia's opinion in R.A.V. "deeply
troubling"); Jerome O'Callaghan, Free Speech by the Light of a Burning Cross, 42 CLEv.
ST. L. REv. 215, 228-37 (1994) (discussing fundamental flaws of R.A.V.); Steven H.
Shiffrin, Racist Speech, OutsiderJurisprudence,and the Meaning of America, 80 CORNELL
L. REv. 43, 56-64 (1994) (explaining that 'Justice Scalia's framework provides
neither a cogent explanation of the doctrinal framework of first amendment law,
nor a sturdy basis for justifying R.A.V.'s result"); Sunstein, supra note 8, at 825-28
(comparing RA. V to other First Amendment decisions); Richard J. Williams, Jr.,
Burning Crosses and Blazing Words: Hate Speech and the Supreme Court's Free SpeechJurisprudence, 5 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 609, 678-79 (1995) (concluding that after
RA.V, "it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to predict where the Court will
move next"); see also EdwardJ. Eberle, Hate Speech, Offensive Speech, and Public Disclosure in America, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1135, 1159-70 (1994) ("Notwithstanding
R.A. V's potential for progress in First Amendment law, it also presents substantial
potential for pitfall.").
59. See Kitrosser, supra note 31, at 869-86 (proposing "[n]ew [a]pproach for
[a]ssessing [c]ontent-[b]ased [r]egulations of [u]nprotected [s]peech").
60. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, ResurrectingFree Speech, 63 FoRDHAMi L. REv.
971, 986 (1995) (approving Supreme Court's reasoning in Mitchell); Sunstein,
supra note 8, at 828 (opining that Mitchell's conclusions were correct); Andrew E.
Taslitz, Condemning the Racist Personality: Why the Critics of Hate Crime Legislation Are
Wrong, 40 B.C. L. REv. 739, 763-64 n.141 (1999) (discussing beneficial applicability
of Mitchell to "the intentional infliction of bodily harm motivated by, and involving
the expression of, racial prejudice"); Lu-in Wang, The TransformingPower of "Hate"
Social Cognition Theory and the Harms of Bias-Related Crimes, 71 S. CAL. L. RExv. 47, 55
n.38 (1997) (noting constitutional congruence of Mitchell which "enhanced punishment where the defendant 'intentionally selected' the victim based on race or
other enumerated group status").
61. See, e.g., Thomas D. Brooks, Note, First Amendment-Penalty Enhancement for
Hate Crimes: Content Regulation, QuestionableState Interests and Non-TraditionalSentencing, 84J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 703, 723-37 (1994) (arguing, for example, that
"Mitchell's conduct fell within the bounds of conduct regarded as expressive
under the First Amendment"); Gey, supra note 29, at 1014 n.5 (citing critical commentary by Mitchell's lawyers, political scientists and students); Lisa M. Stozek,
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alike, however, question whether the decisions in R.A. V and Mitchell can
be reasonably harmonized. 6 2 Similarly, while Black encountered a decidedly mixed reaction, 6 3 commentators of various stripes view the outcomes
64
in Black and R.A.V as contradictory.
Whatever their views on the merits and consistency of the R.A. V trilogy, authors have explored the implications of these holdings for a spectrum of issues. Commentary has addressed, but has not been confined to,

Note, Wisconsin v. Mitchell: The End of Hate Crimes orJust the End of the First Amendment?, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 861, 862 (1994) (concluding that in Mitchell, "the Court
treads dangerously close to criminalizing speech and thought"). But see Alan E.
Brownstein, Alternative Maps for Navigating the First Amendment Maze, 16 CONST.
COMMENT. 101, 141 (1991) (reviewing DANIEL FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT
(1998)) (suggesting that Mitchell poses danger that allowing state to cite speaker's
words as evidence of punishable intent will undermine protection of expression);
Gey, supra note 29, at 1014 (calling outcome in Mitchell "deeply and irrevocably
flawed").
62. See, e.g., Lynn Adelman & Pamela Moorshead, Bad Laws Make Hard Cases:
Hate Crime Laws and the Supreme Court's Opinion in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 30 GONZ.
L. REv. 1, 16 (1994) (asserting that "[i] tis impossible to reconcile R.A.V. and Mitchell in a principled way"); Susan Gellman, Hate Crime Laws Are Thought Crime Laws,
1992 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 509, 516-18 (1992-93); Gey, supra note 29, at 1019 (focusing on "oddly contradictory outcomes" of R.A. V and Mitchell); Cedric Merlin Powell, The Mythological Marketplace of Ideas: R.A.V., Mitchell, and Beyond, 12 HAv.
BLAcKLETrER L.J. 1, 13, 35-36 (1995) (noting that "the Court strains to distinguish"
R.A.V. and Mitchell). But see Eberle, supra note 58, at 1169-70 ("In RA.V and Wisconsin v. Mitchell, the chosen remedy was reliance on conventional First Amendment principles of punishing conduct, not speech, and fighting offensive speech
with counter speech and education, rather than excepting such hate speech from
free debate."); Size & Britton, supranote 57, at 930-31 (explaining that "the [Mitchell] Court engages in an analysis in terms of expressive conduct with only a nod to
R.A. V., a case which it in fact distinguishes").
63. Compare Steven G. Gey, A Few Questions about Cross Burning, Intimidation,
and Free Speech, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1287, 1306 (2005) (characterizing Justice
O'Connor's opinion as "factually disingenuous and legally incoherent"), and
Roger C. Hartley, Cross Burning-Hate Speech as Free Speech: A Comment on Virginia v.
Black, 54 CATH. U. L. REv. 1, 17 (2004) (criticizing Court's decision for "adding yet
another level of uncertainty to First Amendment theory"), with Jeannine Bell, 0
Say, Can You See: FreeExpression by the Light of Fiery Crosses, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
335, 372-86 (2004) (approving bans on cross burning but offering "victim-centered" conception of cross burning as alternative to Court's approach in Black),
and EdwardJ. Eberle, Cross Burning,Hate Speech, and Free Speech in America, 36 ARIz.
ST. L.J. 953, 979-80 (2004) (stating that "Black seems to illuminate a way in which

hate speech could be regulated").
64. See Charles, supra note 58, at 603-07 (concluding that "Black cannot be
squared with R.A.V."); Frederick Schauer, Intentions, Conventions, and the First
Amendment: The Case of Cross-Burning,2003 Sup. CT. REv. 197, 209 (2003) (characterizing Black and R.A. V as "two mutually exclusive precedents"); James L. Swanson, Unholy Fire: Cross Burning, Symbolic Speech, and the First Amendment Virginia v.
Black, 2003 CATO SuP. CT. REv. 81, 102 (2003) (discussing contradictions between
Black and RA.V).
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obviously relevant areas like hate speech, 65 fighting words 66 and hate
crimes. 67 Some have considered how R.A.V threw campus speech
codes-which Justice Blackmun appeared to intimate were an ulterior target of the majority68 -into question. 69 Others ranged further afield to
examine the potential impact of KA.V on sexual harassment laws, 70 regulation of pornography7 ' and broadcast indecency, 72 exemptions from ob-

65. See Eberle, supra note 58 (addressing relation of R.A.V. to hate speech);
Elena Kagan, Regulation of Hate Speech and Pornography after R.A.V., 60 U. CHI. L.
REv. 873, 901-02 (1993) (relating R.A.V to hate speech).
66. See Linda Friedlieb, Comment, The Epitome of an Insult: A Constitutional
Approach to Designated Fighting Words, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 385 (2005) (discussing
relation of R.A. V to fighting words); Aviva 0. Wertheimer, Note, The First Amendment DistinctionBetween Conduct and Content: A Conceptual Framework for Understanding Fighting WordsJurisprudence,63 FoPRDHAM L. REv. 793 (1994) (relating R.A.V to
fighting words).
67. See Alicia Y.Cox, Note, The Constitutionality of State Hate-Crime Legislation
After R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul and Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 33 U. MEM. L. REv. 603
(2003) (addressing relation of R.A.V to hate crimes).
68. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 415-16 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (expressing fear that Court had succumbed to temptation to decide
issue presented in case over "'politically correct speech' and 'cultural diversity'").
69. See Alan E.Brownstein, Hate Speech and Harassment: The Constitutionality of
Campus Codes that Prohibit Racial Insults, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 179 (1994)
(discussing effect of R.A. V on campus codes that prohibit racial insults); Jeanne
M. Craddock, Comment, ConstitutionalLaw-"Words that Injure; Laws that Silence:"
Campus Hate Speech Codes and the Threat to American Education, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REv.
1047, 1060-73 (1995) (same); Thomas C. Grey, How to Write a Speech Code Without
Really Trying: Reflections on the Stanford Experience, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 891, 910-31
(1995) (same); Rhonda G. Hartman, Hateful Expression and First Amendment Values:
Toward a Theory of Constitutional Constraint on Hate Speech at Colleges and University
after R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 19J.C. & U.L. 343 (1993) (same); Turner, supra note 57, at
225-35 (same).
70. See Charles R. Calleros, Title VII and Free Speech: The First Amendment Is Not
Hostile to a Content-Neutral Hostile-Environment Theory, 1996 UTAH L. REv. 227 (1997)
(addressing effect of RA.V on sexual harassment laws); Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom of Expression in the Workplace and the Problem of DiscriminatoryHarassment,75 TEX.
L. REv. 687, 702-707 (1997) (same); Andrea Maryl Kirshenbaum, Hostile Environment Sexual HarassmentLaw and the First Amendment: Can the Two Peacefully Coexist?,
12 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 67 (2002) (same); Robert G.Schwemm & Rigel C. Oliveri,
A New Look at Sexual Harassment Under the Fair Housing Act: The Forgotten Role of
§ 3604(c), 2002 Wis. L. REv. 771, 825-31 (2002) (same).
71. See Kagan, supra note 65, at 876-83 (discussing effect of RA. V on regulation of pornography); Brennan Neville, Anti-PornographyLegislation as Content Discrimination Under R.A.V., 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 121 (1995) (same).
72. See Lili Levi, The Hard Case of BroadcastIndecency, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 49, 151-54 (1993) (addressing effect of R.A.V on broadcast indecency).
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scenity statutes, 7 3 anti-begging ordinances7 4 and the Access to Clinics
Act.

75

While this varied speculation underscores uncertainty about the precise contours of R.A.V, its authority in the courts appears secure, if sparingly invoked. The Court's decisions in Mitchell and Black, while
distinguishing R.A.V, obviously assumed its precedential value. In decisions where the Court has cited R.A.V in connection with striking down
laws, R.A.V. has tended not to play a major role in the Court's analysis,
bolstering conclusions that could be derived from other authority. 76 In
the lower courts as well, no trend of reliance on R.A.V. to invalidate statutes has materialized. With one exception, 77 such decisions have emerged
as occasional isolated instances. 78 Otherwise, as with the Supreme Court,
courts' references to R.A. V tend to appear as supplemental rather than
79
central authority.

73. See Ian L. Saffer, Note, Obscenity Law and the Equal Protection Clause: May
States Exempt Schools, Libraries, and Museums from Obscenity Statutes?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv.
397, 427-38 (1995) (discussing effect of RLA.V on exemptions from obscenity
statutes).
74. See Nancy A. Millich, Compassion Fatigue and the First Amendment: Are the
Homeless Constitutional Castaways?, 27 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 255 (1994) (addressing
effect of R.A.V. on anti-begging ordinances).
75. See Alan E. Brownstein, Rules of Engagement for Cultural Wars: Regulating
Conduct, Unprotected Speech, and Protected Expression in Anti-Abortion Protests, 29 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 553 (1996) (discussing effect of R.A.V. on Access to Clinics Act);
Leslie GielowJacobs, Supplementing the Assumed Definitions:A Commentary on Professor
Brownstein's Analysis of Abortion Protest Restrictions, 29 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 639, 640-46
(1996) (same); Jill W. Rose & Chris Osborn, Note, Face-ial Neutrality:A Free Speech
Challenge to the Freedom of Access to Clinic EntrancesAct, 81 VA. L. REv. 1505, 1521-26
(1995) (same).
76. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc.,
547 U.S. 47 (2006) (citing R.A.V. only once); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 660
(2004) (same); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 573-77 (2001)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing R.A. V only in concurring opinion); United
States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 817 (2000) (citing R.A.V. only
once); Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 582-83 (1998) (contrasting R.A. V as involving statute with constitutional concerns "more evident and
more substantial" than case at hand).

77. For a further discussion of the pitfalls under PA. V. of victim-specific libel
laws, specifically, false allegations of police misconduct, see infra notes 153-90 and
accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., Hornell Brewing Co. v. Minn. Dep't of Pub. Safety, Liquor Control Div., 553 N.W.2d 713, 716-18 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (following R.A.V in striking down state statute barring registration of malt liquor brand label if label states
or misleadingly implies connection with actual living or dead American Indian
leaders).
79. See, e.g., Quetgles v. State, 884 So. 2d 911, 918 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003)
(citing R.A. V. once); Neufeld v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 423, 428
(Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (same); People v. Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 192 (Cal. Ct. App.
2000) (same); People v. Baer, 973 P.2d 1225, 1232 (Colo. 1999) (same).
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CHALLENGING VICTIM-SPECIFIC LIBEL LAWS UNDER

R.A.V

The R.A. V. Court undoubtedly contemplated that its holding would
apply to defamation. To illustrate its underlying principle, the Court
noted that while the government has the power to prohibit libel, it "may
not make the further content discrimination of proscribing only libel critical of the government." 80 In a sense, the inherent ideological neutrality of
conventional libel law forms a crucial part of the justification for allowing
restrictions on this category of speech. 8 ' This does not mean that the state
must treat uniformly all defamatory statements. On the contrary, the
Court devised a series of permutations for determining the barriers that
different plaintiffs must surmount to recover for a defamatory falsehood.
None of these distinctions, however, suggests an exemption from R.A. V's
disapproval of content-based discrimination.

A.

Defamation Under the FirstAmendment

While acknowledging that false statements of fact lack any constitutional value,8 2 the Court has refused to grant libel "talismanic immunity"
from First Amendment scrutiny.8 3 Modern constitutional doctrine has accordingly sought to strike a "proper accommodation" 84 between freedoms
of speech and press and the state interest in redressing harm to reputation.8 5 This balancing exercise has spawned a complex, if not bewilder-

80. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 384 (1992).
81. See, e.g., Shima Baradaran-Robison, Viewpoint Neutral Zoning of Adult
Entertainment Businesses, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 447, 482 (2004) (discussing
"viewpoint neutral, but content-based, regulation"); Shiffrin, supra note 58, at
63-64 (1994) (discussing content neutrality with respect to defamation and
discrimination).
82. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (noting that
"there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact").
83. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) ("[L]ibel can
claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations."). Prior to N.Y.
Times, the Court regarded defamation as wholly outside First Amendment protection. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 256-57, 266 (1952) (rejecting First
Amendment protection for defamatory statements); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (commenting that defamation offers "no essential
part of any exposition of ideas, and [is] of such slight social value as a step to truth
that any benefit that may be derived from [it] is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality").
84. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 325 (attempting to strike balance between freedoms
of speech and press and redressing harm caused to reputation).
85. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1996) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(stating that actions for damages from defamatory falsehoods reflect "no more
than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being").
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ing, 8 6 body of doctrine. 8 7 Though intricate, the standards developed by
the Court can be viewed as falling along four broad axes. Consistent with
R.A. V, each of these groupings assumes an evenhanded approach toward
the content of defendants' speech.
1.

Status of Plaintiff

The centerpiece of constitutional libel law has been the designation
of a plaintiffs status. Under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,8 8 a public official can recover damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to official
conduct only upon a showing of actual malice: i.e., either the defendant
knows that the statement is false or acts with reckless disregard of the statement's falsity. 8 9 The Court's decision in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts9 ° extended the actual malice rule to speech about non-governmental plaintiffs
92
91
Later, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
characterized as "public figures."
the Court ruled that plaintiffs designated as private figures could recover
damages upon a showing of negligence. 93 The Gertz Court also elaborated
on the ways in which public figures attain their identity. Gertz recognized
86. The Court's treatment of defamation has frequently been criticized as
overly fragmented and unnecessarily confusing. See, e.g., LAWRENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 865 (2d ed. 1988) (describing defamation doctrine as "a frustrating tangle for all concerned-a mysterious labyrinth"); Robert
M. Ackerman, Bringing Coherence to Defamation Law Through Uniform Legislation: The
Search for an Elegant Solution, 72 N.C. L. Rv. 291, 293 (1994) (asserting that First
Amendment jurisprudence contributes to "disarray" and "chaotic nature" of defamation law); Sheldon W. Halpern, Of Libel, Language, and Law: New York Times v.
Sullivan at Twenty-Five, 68 N.C. L. REv. 273, 276 (1990) (describing current status
of defamation as "[a] fragmented, confusing and unsatisfying array of criteria and
requirements").
87. See Deeann M. Taylor, Dun & Bradstreet, Hepps and Milkovich: The Lingering Confusion in Defamation Law, 1992 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 153, 158-65 (1993) (providing an overview of evolution of Court's defamation jurisprudence).
88. 376 U.S. at 254.
89. See id. at 279-80 (discussing standards plaintiff must meet to recover for
defamation). While NY. Times involved a civil action, the actual malice standard
was also held to apply to criminal sanctions. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64,
74 (1964) ("What we said of Alabama's civil libel law in [N.Y. Times] applies equally
to the Louisiana criminal libel rule ....

").

90. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). The Court also issued a decision in the companion
case of Associated Press v. Walker. See id. at 130, 140 (noting companion case of
Walker and discussing facts of Walker).
91. See id. at 164-65 (Warren, CJ., concurring) (stating that actual malice standard should apply to "public figures"); see also Harry Kalven, Jr., The Reasonable Man
and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 267, 275-78
(1967) (providing explanation of unusual combination of opinions that forged
Butts' holding on public figures).
92. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
93. See id. at 347, 350 (stating that "the States may define for themselves the
appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual," including negligence). For a further discussion of the broader set of rules governing liability to private figures, see infra
notes 107-08.
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three categories: all-purpose public figures, limited public figures and involuntary public figures. 94 Voluntary limited public figures, who "have
thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved," 9 5 are by far the
most common. 96 Because the actual malice standard presents such a formidable hurdle to plaintiffs, 97 and the question of limited public figure
status is so often ambiguous, 98 dispute over whether the plaintiff qualifies
for this status has been the focal point of legions of cases.
Still, the Court's willingness to grant private figures more potent
means of combating defamatory falsehoods does not imply a general tolerance of content-based disparities in libel law. The R.A.V Court objected
that St. Paul's hate speech ordinance in effect "license[d] one side of a
debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of
Queensberry rules." 9 9 Admittedly, those who defame public officials or
public figures are also permitted to take broader verbal punches because
of the near-immunity conferred by the actual malice requirement. The
difference in burdens borne by public and private plaintiffs, however, does
not represent the tilting of the debate arena that troubled the Court in
RA.V Unlike the apostles of tolerance and proponents of bigotry who
confronted each other in R.A.V., 100 private figures do not systematically
clash with public officials and public figures in defamatory exchanges.
Moreover, the rationales for treating public and private plaintiffs differently are consistent with the principle of ideological neutrality. Libel of
public officials triggers the actual malice barrier not because of a bias in
favor of private figures, but because "[c] riticism of government is at the
10 1
very center of the constitutionally protected area of free discussion."
Similarly, the Court's reference to private individuals as "more deserving
94. See id. at 344-45 (discussing classifications and respective capabilities of
each classification to remedy personal harm caused by defamatory statements).
95. Id. at 345.
96. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAw OF DEFAMATION §§ 2:15-2:77 (2d ed. 1999)
(discussing voluntary limited public figures).
97. See Marc A. Franklin, Winners and Losers and Why: A Study of Defamation
Litigation, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 455, 471, 489, 498 (pointing to "plaintiffs
notable lack of success" in study of defamation decisions).
98. See Rosanova v. Playboy Entm't, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440, 443 (S.D. Ga.
1976) (comparing identification of public figures to "trying to nail ajellyfish to the
wall"), affd, 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978); Alexander D. Del Russo, Freedom of the
Press and Defamation: Attacking the Bastion of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 25 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 501, 518-25 (1981) (canvassing decisions applying Gertz criteria for
distinguishing public and private figures and finding "a maze of seemingly irreconcilable cases").
99. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992) (commenting on selective speech limitations).
100. For a further discussion of the Court's determination that the St. Paul
ordinance amounted to viewpoint discrimination, see supra note 26 and accompanying text.
101. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966) (discussing scope of "public official" designation for purpose of defamation analysis).
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of recovery" than public officials and public figures10 2 does not reflect a
judicial predilection for the former. Rather, in balancing free speech and
reputational interests, the Court has taken into account the assumption
that private figures do not share public individuals' voluntary exposure to
heightened risk of harm from defamatory falsehood. 10 3
2.

Subject Matter of Defamatory Statement

A libel plaintiff's burden also depends on the subject matter of the
defamatory statement; again, however, the Court's classification scheme
does not embody ideological preferences. In the case of public officials,
the actual malice standard applies when the statement is regarded as "relating to [the plaintiffs] official conduct." 10 4 The category arises from the
Court's understanding of "the central meaning of the First Amendment,"10 5 and obviously has no partisan slant. Likewise, libel of a limited
public figure should pertain to the controversy in which the plaintiff is
involved to qualify for the actual malice standard. 10 6 This requirement,
too, favors no particular cause. Finally, a private figure who complains of a
falsehood involving a matter of public concern must show actual malice to
recover punitive or presumed damages. 10 7 No such showing is required
102. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) (contrasting
public figures and private plaintiffs interests in reputation).
103. See id. (making generalizations with respect to classes of plaintiffs). As an
additional consideration, the Gertz Court also noted that private individuals are
more vulnerable to injury because they lack the access to channels of public communication generally enjoyed by public officials and public figures. See id. at 344
(same). This rationale also should not be viewed as aligning the Court with a
particular ideological camp.
104. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964) (setting forth
actual malice standard as limitation on recovery of public officials). In practice,
this criterion has not proved to be a strict limitation on the range of comment on
public officials subject to the actual malice standard. See Nat Stern, Private Concerns
of Private Plaintiffs: Revisiting a ProblematicDefamation Category, 65 Mo. L. REv. 597,
606 n.57 (2000) (noting broad interpretation of requirement that actionable statement must be relevant to public official's performance or capacity).
105. See N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 273 (stating that reputational concerns and
factual error do not warrant removing constitutional protection for criticism of
public officials).
106. See Charles A. Armgardt, Libel and Slander, Sept. 21, 1998, http://
www.modrall.com/articles/article_12-1.html (stating that limited public figures
are subject to actual malice standard only "when they are defamed in connection
with the issues in which they are a public figure"); see alsoJames C. Mitchell, The
Accidental Purist: Reclaiming the Gertz All Purpose Public Figure Doctrine in the Age of
"CelebrityJournalism",22 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 559, 574 (2002) (proposing two-step
analysis for determining whether public figures are required to prove actual
malice).
107. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 75657 (1985) (plurality opinion) (summarizing burden of proof on private figure
plaintiff where defamatory statement involves matter of public concern); Gertz, 418
U.S. at 349 (setting forth limitation on recovery of damages under state defamation law).
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where the libel does not pertain to a matter of public concern. 10 8 While
this distinction has elicited considerable criticism, the attacks have focused
on the alleged inconsistency with prior pronouncements, 10 9 vagueness,' 1 0
aggravation of complexity,' 1 1 and inherent futility. 1 12 Whatever its other
defects, the dichotomy does not appear to lack neutrality.
3.

Interpretive Principles

Another set of rulings addresses the threshold question of whether a
libel defendant's statement can validly be understood as asserting a defamatory falsehood about the plaintiff. The requirement that the statement
be "of and concerning" the plaintiff precludes recovery based on dubious
references.1 13 Likewise, accusations that realistically represent rhetorical
1 14
hyperbole are spared the consequences of more literal interpretations.
115
More broadly, the Court in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,
while rejecting a wholesale dichotomy between actionable statements of fact and
privileged statements of opinion,' 16 affirmed that statements must be sus108. See Dun &Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 763 (plurality opinion) (concluding that
private figure plaintiffs may recover punitive and presumed damages without proving actual malice where defamatory statement does not involve matter of public
concern).
109. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, The ConstitutionalConcept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, DemocraticDeliberation,and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L.
REv. 601, 667 n.327 (1990); Rodney A. Smolla, Dun & Bradstreet, Hepps, and Liberty Lobby: A New Analytic Primer on the Future Course of Defamation, 75 GEo. LJ.
1519, 1541 (1987).
110. See, e.g., Arlen W. Langvardt, Public Concern Revisited: A New Role for an Old
Doctrine in the ConstitutionalLaw of Defamation, 21 VAL. U. L. REv. 241, 266 (1987);
Andrew Jay McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability
for Intrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. REv. 989, 1082 (1995); Eugene Volokh,
Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop
Peoplefrom Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1097-98 (2000).
111. See, e.g., JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1274 (7th ed. 2004); Don Lewis, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
Inc., Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, and Speech on Matters of Public Concern: New
Directions in First Amendment Defamation Law, 20 IND. L. REv. 767, 782 (1987); The
Supreme Court, 1984 Term-ConstitutionalLaw, 99 HARv. L. REv. 120, 217-18 (1985).
112. See, e.g., Daniel 0. Conkle, The IndianaSupreme Court s EmergingFree Speech
Doctrine, 69 IND. L.J. 857, 861 n.36 (1994); Lawrence Rosenthal, Permissible Content
Discrimination Under the First Amendment: The Strange Case of the Public Employee, 25
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 529, 551 n.114 (1998).
113. SeeRosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 82-83 (1966) (finding "indiscriminate
suspicion" cast on small group constitutionally insufficient for recovery by any
group member).
114. See Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 285-86 (1974) (referring to plaintiffs as "traitors"); Greenbelt
Coop. Publ'g Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13 (1970) (accusing plaintiffs of
"blackmail").
115. 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
116. See id. at 18, 21 (rejecting constitutional privilege for statements of opinion). Prior to Milkovich, the existence of this type of distinction had been widely
accepted in the courts. E.g., Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 881 F.2d 1426, 1431-32
(8th Cir. 1989); Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 974-75 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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ceptible to being proved false to trigger liability. 117 Finally, a defendant
can be held accountable for deliberately misattributing words to a plaintiff
only if the alteration materially changed the meaning conveyed by the
plaintiffs original statement.' 1 8
These interpretive rules are couched in terms of sufficient generality
to avoid any taint of ideological slant. The requirement that the offending
passage unequivocally refer to the plaintiff does not depend on the plaintiff s political or social views. Whether a plaintiff can recover for being
called a "liar" hinges on a reasonable audience's view that the defendant's
statement makes a provably false assertion, 119 not its views of either party's
beliefs. Similarly, liberals and conservatives alike have equal opportunity
to demonstrate that misquotations of their words amount to actionable
distortions.
4.

ProceduralRequirements

A fourth cluster of holdings directs the manner in which libel litigation proceeds through the courts. These are the types of procedural rules
that appear not to advance any special agenda. For example, mandatory
independent appellate review of determinations of actual malice 120 obviously helps defendants, but not defendants of any particular ilk. The same
can be said of the requirement that summary judgment be granted to the
defendant where a public figure's opposing affidavit does not support an
inference of actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. 12 1 Conversely, the subjection of media defendants' editorial processes to inquiry
for evidence of actual malice 12 2 benefits all kinds of plaintiffs.
117. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19-20 (deeming statements that reasonably imply false assertions of defamatory fact actionable); Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v.
Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986) (requiring private figure plaintiff to prove falsity
in defamation action against media defendant). The Court has not addressed
whether this principle applies beyond statements by media defendants on matters
of public concern. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19-20 (reviewing cases).
118. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991) (concluding that meaning of statement determines falsity, rather than minor
inaccuracies).
119. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20-21 (focusing inquiry on reasonable interpretation of statement).
120. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 514
(1984) (reaffirming independent appellate review); see also Harte-Hanks
Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 685 (1989) (deeming question of
whether evidence in defamation case supports finding of actual malice question of
law).
121. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254-55 (1986) (holding that determination of existence of genuine issue of material fact must be
guided by substantive evidentiary standards of case).
122. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 169-76 (1979) (declining to extend
privilege to editorial process).
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The Framework for Challenges to Victim-Specific Libel Laws Under RA.V.
The Court's opinion in R.A. V. broadly calls into question content-

based regulations even within proscribable categories, not just overt viewpoint discrimination. As a category that has been accorded substantial
First Amendment protection, defamation represents an especially fertile
area for the application of this principle. Moreover, at least some victimspecific libel laws may cloak the kind of functional discrimination that
proved fatal in R.A.V Where such a law does so, it is unlikely to be salvaged by one of R.A.V's three exceptions.
R.A.V's principles can be readily transplanted to defamation law in
general and victim-specific statutes in particular. Indeed, punishment of
libel may offer a more compelling case for application of R.A. V's reasoning than the fighting words involved in R.A. V itself. In contrast to fighting
words, which receive no protection, 123 the Court has recognized the necessity of shielding much libel from liability in order to preserve "breathing space"'

24

for vigorous speech and to avoid "self-censorship."1

25

At the

same time, defamatory speech is at least as vulnerable to restrictions as
fighting words; as has been recognized, jury verdicts can readily become
vehicles for majoritarian suppression of unpopular viewpoints. 1 26 Wariness of selective libel laws thus flows logically from the R.A. V Court's declaration that "[t]he point of the First Amendment is that majority
preferences must be expressed in some fashion other than silencing
27
speech on the basis of its content.'
Laws that particularly penalize defamation of specific segments of society should at least arouse suspicion under the Court's principle. While
"content" does not have a precise and consistent meaning,1 2s victim-specific libel laws appear as content-based as the subject matter restrictions
disapproved in R.A. V Like St. Paul's ban on only certain kinds of fighting
words, victim-specific defamation laws target "those speakers who express
views on disfavored subjects."' 29 A victim-specific defamation law repre123. See Melody L. Hurdle, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul: The Continuing Confusion
of the Fighting Words Doctrine, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1143, 1158-60 (1994) (reviewing
RA.V majority opinion).

124. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974) (quoting

NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)) (noting competing interests of freedom of speech and press and redressability of wrongful injury).
125. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964) (finding absolute
defense of truth unduly burdensome on criticism of official conduct).
126. See TRIBE, supra note 86, § 12-13, at 882 (stating that "where first amendment rights are at stake . . . jurors are likely to represent majoritarian attitudes
toward unpopular speakers and ideas").
127. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992).
128. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of Its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-MatterRestrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 81, 83, 99 (1978) (discussing
Court's inconsistent treatment of subject-matter restrictions within content-based
framework).
129. See R.A. V, 505 U.S. at 391 (finding that content discrimination rendered
ordinance facially unconstitutional).
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sents the state's judgment that libel of individuals in the designated category is especially odious. When St. Paul similarly sought to display its
"special hostility towards the particular biases" specified in its ordinances,
however, the Court ruled "[t]hat is precisely what the First Amendment
0
forbids."13
Likewise, the absence of express viewpoint discrimination does not
immunize victim-specific libel laws. While the Court found that St. Paul's
ordinance effected viewpoint discrimination, this conclusion was stated as
additional rather than necessary grounds for invalidation. 1 3 1 Moreover,
even if viewpoint discrimination were considered relevant, it need not be
explicit. It was the "practical operation" 132 of St. Paul's ordinance, not its
formal prohibitions, that rendered it discriminatory toward viewpoints.
Laws that effectively confer heightened protection on the reputations of
certain people should similarly implicate R.A. V.'s concern for operational
viewpoint discrimination. The state's elevation of some citizens' reputations in "practical operation" skews debate in their favor. In any event, the
"presumptive invalidity"' 33 of content-based restrictions should suffice to
defeat at least some victim-specific libel laws. These laws will fail to meet
the requirement that they must be "necessary to serve the asserted [compelling] interest."' 34 On the contrary, the existence of an obvious "adequate
content-neutral alternative[ ] '

35

-viz.,

a libel law that equally protects cit-

izens' reputations-shows that there is no need to selectively protect the
reputations of some.
It is true that the R.A.V opinion contains dicta that would arguably
deflect challenges to victim-specific libel laws, but that reasoning ignores
the differences between fighting words and libel. The opinion states that
a prohibition of fighting words "that are directed at certain persons or
groups... would be facially valid if it met the requirements of the Equal
Protection Clause." 136 Taken literally and transported to defamation, this
statement appears to make victim-specific libel laws presumptively valid.
Understood in context, however, this passage does not extrapolate to approval of targeted libel laws. In the same sentence, the Court contrasted
130. See id. at 396 (holding that content discrimination was not reasonably
necessary to achieve compelling interest).
131. See id. at 391 (holding ordinance facially unconstitutional for content
discrimination, then stating "moreover, the ordinance goes even beyond mere content discrimination, to actual viewpoint discrimination") (emphasis added).
132. See id. (finding ordinance more problematic than "mere content
discrimination").
133. See id. at 390 n.6 (stating presumptive invalidity leaves room for
exceptions).
134. See id. at 395 (alterations in original) (quoting Burson v. Freeman, 504
U.S. 191, 199 (1992) (plurality opinion)) (stating standard of scrutiny for facially
content-based statute).
135. See id. (finding that existence of content-neutral alternative defeated argument that ordinance was narrowly tailored).
136. Id. at 392.
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its hypothetical valid statute with St. Paul's impermissible ban on
"messages of 'bias-motivated' hatred." 13 7 By the same token, victim-specific libel laws inevitably suppress messages that are critical of the objects
of the libel. Restrictions on fighting words aimed at certain classes of people only shield those persons from being subjected to abusive invective. In
that sense, they resemble those instances in which the Court has upheld
laws as restricting only the form of the speech. 138 Special restrictions on
libel, on the other hand, inherently detract from the substance of criticism
as well.
It should not be assumed, moreover, that an otherwise suspect victimspecific libel law would readily qualify for one of /A. V's three exceptions.
In the case of such laws, acceptance of the exception for content discrimination whose basis "consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of
speech at issue is proscribable" 139 could swallow the rule. The reason that
defamation is proscribable is that it inflicts injury on the reputation of its
victim. In a sense, then, any victim-specific libel law could be justified as
protecting the exceptionally fragile or important reputation of members
of the designated group. 140 It seems unlikely that a rationale of egregious
harm could be contained in a principled way. The prerogative of the state
to implement this value judgment in some instances would extend logically to many, if not all, other instances as well. Victim-specific libel laws'
awkward fit into this "virulence exception" 141 is underscored by their distinction from laws found to meet the exception. To illustrate the exception, the RA. V. Court pointed to a hypothetical law banning "only that
obscenity which is the most patently offensive in its prurience."'42 If this
example has any counterpart in libel, it would be the availability of puni137. See id. (quoting In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510 (Minn.
1991), rev'd sub nom., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992)) (describing St.
Paul's disorderly conduct ordinance).
138. See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 308
(1984); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 743 n.18, 746 n.22 (1978).
139. See RA.V, 505 U.S. at 388 (finding this reason sufficiently neutral to justify distinction in First Amendment protection within class of speech).
140. Arguably, this type of premise was relied upon to sustain the group libel
statute at issue in Beauharnaisv. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). The statute prohibiting utterances promoting friction among racial and religious groups was enforced
against a man who had distributed literature portraying the putative depravity and
criminality of African-Americans. See id. at 252 (reciting charge in information).
Developments since New York Times, [376 U.S. 254 (1964),] however, have called
into serious question the continued validity of Beauharnais. See Am. Booksellers
Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 331 n.3 (7th Cir. 1985) (asserting that subsequent
cases had "so washed away the foundations of Beauharnais that it could not be
considered authoritative"), affd mem., 471 U.S. 1001 (1986); TRmBE, supra note 86,
§ 12-12, at 861 n.2 ("The continuing validity of the Beauharnais holding is very
much an open question.").
141. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 382 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); see also id. at 363 (referring to cross burning with
intent to intimidate as "[a] particularly virulent form of intimidation").
142. R.A.V, 505 U.S. at 388.
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tive damages for flagrant commission of a defamatory falsehood. As noted
above, however, allowing states to treat libel of certain persons as flagrant
per se would license unlimited discrimination in assessing the worth of
their citizens' reputations. The logic of another example, criminalization
of threats against the President, 143 does not extend to support of victimspecific libel laws either. It is one thing to acknowledge the singular dangers posed by threats of violence to the President; 144 it is quite another to
deem libel of a potential plethora of groups to inflict special harms. Similarly, the willingness expressed in Black to uphold bans on cross burning
with intent to intimidate furnishes no basis for generally sustaining victimspecific libel laws. Few, if any, forms of libel parallel the extraordinary if
45
not unique history of cross burning as a tool of intimidation.1
Attempts to justify victim-specific libel laws by their putative concern
with the "secondary effects" of the targeted defamation likewise present
concerns that this exception could overwhelm R.A.V.'s general rule. The
secondary effects doctrine permits content-based restrictions on speech
where the restrictions seek to curb adverse effects tending to flow from
speech of certain content rather than to silence the message conveyed by
that speech. 146 The doctrine is largely associated with regulation of sexually oriented expression and alleged harms to the community arising from
its display or sale. 147 No comparable secondary effects could be ascribed
to defamation of certain plaintiffs without depriving the exception of any
limiting concept. The injuries typically caused by defamatory falsehood"impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering" 148 -constitute the direct effects of that speech. If any of these were somehow characterized as
secondary, it is difficult to see how that label could be confined to libel's
impact on only certain kinds of individuals. The state would thus be empowered to guard against the "secondary effects" of libel on any class of
persons whom it thought deserving of special protection. Such unbridled
authority does not match the ordinary notion of an "exception."

143. See id. (explaining why threats against President are outside First Amendment protection).
144. For a discussion of not providing First Amendment protection to threats
against the President, see supra note 29 and accompanying text.
145. For a discussion of cross burning, see supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
146. See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) (discussing
secondary effects doctrine).
147. See, e.g., Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 290-99 (2000) (O'Connor, J.,
plurality opinion); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 583 (1991) (Souter,
J., concurring); see also Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 n.34
(1976) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion)
148. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
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As to the catchall exception, the vague nature of this category renders
its application to victim-specific libel laws or other laws elusive. 149 The
Court has offered little guidance as to when content discrimination "is
such that there is no realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is
afoot." 150 Justice Scalia's hypothetical example sheds little light on the
concept: "We cannot think of any First Amendment interest that would
stand in the way of a State's prohibiting only those obscene motion pictures with blue-eyed actresses."1 5' In order to render R.A.V's central
holding meaningful, however, the state should bear a heavy burden of
demonstrating that its content-based restriction in no way promotes "official suppression of ideas." 152 In the case of victim-specific libel laws, the
state's ability to meet that burden will vary according to the type of plaintiff, the nature of the preferential treatment, and the implications of the
statute at issue for broader First Amendment values. How these dynamics
might play out in the context of some current laws is explored in Part III.
III.

THE VULNERABILITY OF CURRENT LAWS

The pitfalls under R.A.V of victim-specific libel laws can be illustrated
by four types of statutes: penalties for filing false complaints against police
officers, bans on defamatory statements about political candidates,
prohibitions on falsely imputing unchastity to women, and civil liability for
defamation of agricultural products. Indeed, challenges already mounted
against the first type have been successful in some instances. All four types
of statutes demonstrate the dangers of seeking to advance worthy aims
through selective restrictions on speech.
A.

False Allegations of Police Misconduct

One defamation statute that has already tested the reach of R.A. V is
California Penal Code section 148.6, which provides: "Every person who
files any allegation of misconduct against any peace officer... knowing the
allegation to be false, is guilty of a misdemeanor."' 53 Courts have split
over the constitutionality of this provision; the law and its civil counter149. See The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Leading Cases, 117 HARv. L.

REv.

339,

345 (2003) (asserting that majority in Virginia v. Black "left the exact nature of this
third RA.V. 'exception' uncertain, which will likely perpetuate its uneven application by lower courts").
150. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 390 (1992).
151. Id.
152. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 384 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (urging that content-based statute should have "high
probability" of no official suppression of ideas to qualify for catchall exception).
153. CAL. PENAL CODE § 148.6(a) (1) (West 2005). The origin of the statute is
recounted in Harvey Gee, The First Amendment and Police Misconduct: Criminal Penalty for Filing Complaints Against Police Officers, 27 HAMLINE L. REv. 225, 247-50

(2004).
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part 1 54 have been struck down in federal litigation,1 5 5 but have found
favor in California courts. 156 While the federal court decisions recognize
the manner in which victim-specific statutes can run afoul of R.A.V's doctrine, 15 7 the state court rulings demonstrate the hazards of an overly expansive reading of R.A.V's exceptions.
That this type of statute triggers R.A. V's scrutiny of content-based discrimination is incontestable. Thus, one court simply noted that section
148.6 "prohibits only the subclass of defamation directed at peace officers"
before proceeding to determine whether the provision might qualify for
one of R.A. V's exceptions. 15 8 Another spelled out the contrast between
California's civil provision authorizing actions by peace officers and the
absence of similar recourse for comparably vulnerable professions such as
physicians and attorneys. 159 The discriminatory character of that provision is especially pronounced because it carves out an exception to California's general privilege for criticism of public officials. 160 Indeed, when
Nevada criminalized the filing of false misconduct charges only against
61
police officers, the state did not deny that its statute was content-based.
154. See CAL.CIV. CODE § 47.5 (West 2006) (authorizing defamation action by
peace officer for false statements made in citizen complaints regarding officer's
conduct to officer's law enforcement agency employer).
155. See Hamilton v. City of San Benardino, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1091 (C.D.
Cal. 2004) (holding that section 148.6 "does not come within the three R.A.V
categories of permissible content-based subclass regulation, and is facially unconstitutional"); Haddad v. Wall, 107 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1238 (C.D. Cal. 2000), vacated,
48 Fed. App'x 279 (9th Cir. 2002) (striking down California police libel statute);
Gritchen v. Collier, 73 F. Supp. 2d 1148 (C.D. Cal. 1999), rev'd on othergrounds, 254
F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 2001) (same); see also Eakins v. Nevada, 219 F. Supp. 2d 1113,
1121 (D. Nev. 2002) (striking down Nevada statute making it misdemeanor to
knowingly file false allegations against peace officer); State v. English, 776 N.E.2d
1179, 1183 (Ohio Mun. 2002) (striking down similar Ohio statute).
156. See People v. Stanistreet, 58 P.3d 465, 474 (Cal. 2003) (upholding criminal provision); Loshonkohl v. Kinder, 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 114, 120 (Cal. Ct. App.
2003) (upholding civil action). But see Walker v. Kiousis, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 69, 89
(Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (invalidating civil action).
157. For an argument that section 148.6 also violates the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, see Gee, supra note 153, at 257-62.
158. Hamilton, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 1091.
159. See Walker, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 84-85 (contrasting statute's applicability
between peace officers and other professionals).
160. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 47.5 (West 2006) (allowing peace officers to bring
defamation suits for false complaints); Imig v. Ferrar, 138 Cal. Rptr. 540, 543-45
(Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (construing privilege to encompass citizens' complaints
against public officials filed with administrative agency); see also Haddad, 107 F.
Supp. 2d at 1234 (stating that section 47.5 "creates a distinction based on the content of the statements-whether the complaints are about peace officers or other
public officials"); Gritchen, 73 F. Supp. 2d at 1152 (describing scope of statute);
English, 776 N.E.2d at 1183 (finding that Ohio statute making crime of filing false
complaint against peace officer "singles out peace officers and places them into a
special privileged category").
161. SeeEakins v. Nevada, 219 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1118 (D. Nev. 2002) (noting
state's admission that law targeted content-based speech).
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Even decisions upholding California's statutes aimed at false complaints
against peace officers, by looking to an exception to RA. V's prohibition,
162
tacitly concede that the prohibition generally applies.
Furthermore, section 148.6 and the civil provision illustrate why the
exception for discrimination based on the "very reason" that the class of
speech is proscribable should be narrowly construed. As noted earlier, the
"very reason" that defamation is proscribable is the harm that it inflicts on
reputation. The state should not be able to exalt the reputations of police
officers by treating libel against them as especially heinous. 163 Nor are the
reputations of police officers exceptionally fragile compared to others who
can be defamed with relative impunity under California law. 164 Even a
justice who concurred in the California Supreme Court's approval of section 148.6 denied that the reason that defamation is proscribable applies
with "special force" to peace officers.' 65 On the contrary, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly recognized that criticism of public officials lies at the
heart of the First Amendment's protection of freedom of speech. 16 6 In162. See People v. Stanistreet, 58 P.3d 465, 470 (Cal. 2003) (accepting concept
that prohibition applies); Loshonkohl v. Kinder, 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 114, 118 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2003) (same).
163. See Hamilton, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 1092 (asserting that "society's interest in
protecting reputation, and discouraging dissemination of falsehoods . . .do[es]
not permit a distinction in the treatment of false statements based on the fact that
the statements concern law enforcement officers").
164. See Walker, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 69. In Walker, the court compared the
cause of action for peace officers with legal barriers imposed on physicians, attorneys and political office holders for alleged misstatements about them. The court
noted that physicians "are at least as vulnerable to charges of incompetence" as
peace officers, that attorneys often deal with hostile persons who have strong motivation to make false accusations harmful to their reputation, and that office holders are subject to wider scrutiny and "are required to take often controversial and
unpopular public positions[.]" Id. at 84-85. See Haddad, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 1236
(denying that peace officers experience "particular vulnerability to reputational
injury"); see also Gee, supra note 153, at 254 n.141 (noting administrative and legal
protections available to guard peace officers against frivolous complaints).
165. See Stanistreet, 58 P.3d at 475 (Werdegar, J., concurring) (finding section
148.6justified in light of secondary effects but asserting that court's majority "identifies nothing about false speech affecting peace officers that distinguishes it from
false speech affecting other governmental officials with respect to the grounds on which
defamation is proscribable in the first placd').
166. See, e.g., Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 632 (1990) (noting that publication of information regarding alleged governmental misconduct is "speech
which has traditionally been recognized as lying at the core of the First Amendment"); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966) (stating that "[c]riticism of government is at the very center of the constitutionally protected area of free
discussion"); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 72-73 (1964) (stating that "where
the criticism is of public officials and their conduct of public business, the interest
in private reputation is overborne by the larger public interest, secured by the
Constitution, in the dissemination of truth"); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 270 (1964) (acknowledging "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and
that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials"); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
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deed, the Court has specifically recognized that the First Amendment
"protects a significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed at
police officers."

1 67

The California Supreme Court's decision upholding section 148.6
only underscores the dangers of an overly indulgent approach to R.A. V's
first exception. In People v. Stanistreet,16 8 the court emphasized that complaints about peace officers must be investigated and-along with any reports or findings-retained for five years. Thus, the court concluded, the
"potential harm of a knowingly false statement is greater here than in
other situations." 1 69 The obligation to investigate complaints and retain
records of their consequences, however, hardly distinguishes peace officers from a host of other professions. Lawyers, 170 physicians, 171 and
other designated public officials 172 are exposed to similar processes. To
find, therefore, that the reason for defamation's proscribability applies to
them with "special force" is to inflate this special exception into a major
loophole. The Stanistreet court's reliance on Mitchell to justify section
148.6173 is also misplaced. The Mitchell Court heavily based its distinction
of Wisconsin's hate crime statute from St. Paul's invalid ordinance on the
Wisconsin statute's regulation of conduct rather than speech. 174 Section
148.6, by contrast, squarely penalizes speech.
Similarly, the Stanistreet court's contention that section 148.6 can be
justified by the "secondary effects" of the speech that it penalizes 1 75 demonstrates the potentially dangerous malleability of that exception. As an
example of a content-based ban that could be justified by the targeted
speech's secondary effects, the R.A. V.Court cited a law permitting all obscene live performances except those involving minors. 176 A law of this
nature would obviously reflect the state's underlying concern with the
harmful impact on minors of such performances irrespective of any
U.S. 323, 345 (1974) (finding public officials less deserving of protection from
defamation in part because they have "voluntarily exposed themselves to increased
risk of injury from defamatory falsehood concerning them").
167. City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461 (1987).
168. 58 P.3d 465 (Cal. 2003).
169. Id. at 472.
170. See, e.g., S.C. App. CT. R. 413, R. 19 (2005) (describing misconduct re-

porting regulations for lawyers); UTAH CODEJUD. ADMIN. R. 14-510 (2005) (same).
171. See, e.g.,
Amiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-1403.01 (2005) (describing misconduct reporting regulations for doctors); ME. Rv. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 3282-A
(2005) (same).
172. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-82 (2004) (describing ethics regulations
for public officials); FLA. STAT. § 112.324 (2006) (same); Miss. CODE ANN. § 25-4-21
(2004) (same).

173. See Stanistreet, 58 P.3d at 472 (relying on Mitchell to support § 148.6).
174. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487 (1993) (explaining holding

of Mitchell Court).
175. See Stanistreet, 58 P.3d at 472.
176. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992) (noting example
where secondary effects of speech justified ban).
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messages that they may contain. 177 By contrast, section 148.6 is aimed at
speech about peace officers and seeks to curb the direct effects of that
speech. False complaints about peace officers can harm their reputations
and careers. These are troubling consequences that a state would understandably try to prevent. The seriousness of these consequences, however,
does not make them secondary effects if that term is to describe an exceptional circumstance rather than the impact shared by most victims of defamatory falsehoods.
Nevertheless, the Stanistreet court found that section 148.6 was addressed to secondary effects arising from the investigative process triggered by complaints against peace officers: the expenditure of public
resources, the potential adverse effect of complaints on accused officers'
careers, and the susceptibility of complaints to discovery in criminal proceedings. 1 7 8 This chain of causation, however, proves too much. If this
reasoning is accepted, then the state can bootstrap a special cause of action for defamation out of R.A. V's general prohibition by requiring some
sort of investigatory process. The secondary effects exception could thus
be transformed into an easy mechanism for circumventing the ban on
content-based restrictions.
Finally, section 148.6 should not be considered an instance where "no
realistic possibility" exists that the state is engaging in the suppression of
ideas. A contrary conclusion would go far toward allowing a court to assert, ipse dixit, that it has detected no such possibility. Both the Stanistreet
opinion and a California lower court opinion upholding the civil provision 179 demonstrate the potential danger of the catchall exception. The
Stanistreetcourt found sufficient rebuttal to the concern that section 148.6
stifles opinion in the fact that California's legislature was "not suppressing
all complaints of police misconduct, only knowingly false ones."1 80 This
approach is strikingly permissive, for it would qualify any content-based
libel law for the catchall exception where the state imposed the actual
malice standard. The lower court found comfort in the observation that
the civil provision "does not prohibit expression of ideas, political con1 81
If it excepts or criticisms of peace officers, specifically or in general."
plicitly did so, of course, such egregious violation of core free speech
rights would scarcely need the invocation of R.A.V to be struck down.
Rather, the criterion should be whether a possible effect of suppressing
ideas can be safely ruled out. This is hardly the case with the peace officer
177. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982) ("The prevention of
sexual exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a government objective of
surpassing importance.").
178. See Stanistreet,58 P.3d at 472 (holding that "secondary effects justify [section 148.6] on neutral basis without reference to the content of the speech").
179. See generally Loshonkohl v. Kinder, 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 114 (Cal. Ct. App.
2003) (upholding civil police-specific libel statute).

180. 58 P.2d at 472.
181. Loshonkohl, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 119 (describing application of statute).
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statutes. On the contrary, as federal courts have recognized, these statutes
are not analogous to a ban on obscene movies with blue-eyed actresses
that R.A.V. cited as an example of the catchall category. 182 Unlike that
hypothetical law, California's statutes have the effect of discouraging a certain type of protected expression: viz., valid complaints against peace officers. 183 Moreover, by singling out defamatory citizen complaints against
peace officers rather than penalizing all false statements made in such proceedings, the statutes functionally enforce viewpoint discrimination as
184
much as the St. Paul's hate speech ordinance.
Since the content-based restrictions of California's peace officer statutes do not fall into any of R.A.V.'s exceptions, such restrictions should
survive only if they are narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest. 185 It almost goes without saying that California's statutes
do not meet this stern test. The notion that such measures are necessary
to shield police officers from impediments to the effective performance of
their duties is refuted by the widespread absence of such statutes elsewhere. 1 8 6 Indeed, other methods of advancing this interest come readily
to mind, such as: (1) requiring citizen complaints to be made under oath
so as to subject false complaints to penalties for perjury, 18 7 (2) securing
the confidentiality of officers' personnel files, 188 and (3) removing unsubstantiated complaints from these files. 189 Furthermore, as with all classes
that the state would specially protect with victim-specific libel laws, police
officers can avail themselves of the state's general actions for defamation.
California's statutes, therefore, can be analogized to St. Paul's impermissibly selective ordinance, whose legitimate aims could be attained by a
90
broader ban on fighting words.'
182. See Haddad v. Wall, 107 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1237 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (distinguishing facts from R.A.V); Gritchen v. Collier, 73 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1152 (C.D.
Cal. 1999), rev'd on other grounds, 254 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 2001) (same).
183. See Hamilton v. City of San Benardino, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1094 (C.D.
Cal. 2004) (describing effect of statute); see also Eakins v. Nevada, 219 F. Supp. 2d
1113, 1120 (D. Nev. 2002) (striking down similar Nevada statute).
184. See Gee, supra note 153, at 252.
185. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992) (noting proper test
applied for content-based statute).
186. See Gritchen, 73 F. Supp. 2d at 1154 (reviewing state-by-state privileges for
citizens' complaints against police officers).
187. See id. at 1153 (illustrating possible alternatives to content-based censorship); see also Haddad, 107 F. Supp. at 1238 (illustrating deterrent effect of perjury
charges).
188. See Walker v. Kiousis, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 69, 89 (Ct. App. 2001) (noting
that "there are ways other than the content-based discrimination imposed by section 47.5 to ensure that peace officers' careers are not unduly jeopardized by unfounded citizen complaints").
189. See id. (illustrating alternatives to content-based discrimination).
190. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395-96 (1992) (illustrating
alternatives to content-based censorship available to city council).
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PoliticalCandidates

A more defensible but still problematic measure against the defamation of particular individuals is penalization of defamatory falsehoods
191
In Florida, for
about political candidates. Such statutes are common.

example, it is illegal to make or cause to be made, with actual malice, "any
1.."192
A California
statement about an opposing candidate which is false .
statute makes a candidate liable for defamation by a committee that she
controls if she "willfully and knowingly directs or permits" the defamatory

falsehood.' 93 There are numerous statutes that similarly hold candidates
and others accountable for false accusations against their political
opponents.

19 4

It is difficult not to sympathize with the impulse behind such statutes.
In light of the sordid history of scurrilous gossip and other disinformation
in political campaigns, 1 9 5 the goal of cleansing the process of these
"smear" campaign tactics is unassailable. Such distortion of political dialogue vitiates the democratic system. 19 6 Moreover, unlike California's
peace officer statutes, these efforts to curb defamation of candidates do
not effect viewpoint discrimination; presumably candidates of all ideological stripes fall under their protection. In addition, the statutes are typi191. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 20501 (a) (West 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 104.271(1) (West 2006) (amended in Feb. 2006, to take effectJuly 1, 2006) (regulating libel by political candidates); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211B.06 (1) (West 2005)
(same); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-10-04 (2003) (same); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 3517.21(B) (2-10) (West 2005) (same); OR. REV. STAT. § 260.532 (1) (2003)
192. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.271 (1) (amended in Feb. 2006, to take effectJuly
1, 2006).
193. CAL. Eluc. CODE § 20501 (a).
194. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211B.06 (1) (designating as gross misdemeanor intentional participation in false political advertising or campaign material
about candidate for public office that is "designed or tends to elect, injure, promote, or defeat a candidate.., to a public office"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-10-04
(penalizing as misdemeanor knowing sponsorship of political advertisement or
news release containing information about candidate's prior record that sponsor
"knows to be untrue, deceptive, or misleading"); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 3517.21 (B) (2-10) (establishing crime of making various false statements about
political candidate, including dissemination of false statement concerning candidate "if the statement is designed to promote the ... defeat of the candidate"); id.
at (B)(10); OR. REv. STAT. § 260.532 (1) (2003) (barring publication containing
"false statement of material fact relating to any candidate").
195. See generally KERWIN C. SWINT, MUDSLINGERS: THE Top 25 NEGATIVE POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS Or ALL TIME (Praeger Publishers 2006) (identifying egregious examples of incivility in political campaigns).
196. See Hampel v. Mitten, 278 N.W. 431, 435 (Wis. 1938) (describing distructive effects on democratic system). According to the Supreme Court of Wisonsin,
"[n]othing is more important in a democracy than the accurate recording of the
untrammeled will of the electorate. Gravest danger to the state is present where
this will does not find proper expression due to the fact that electors are corrupted
or are misled." Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol52/iss3/4

28

Stern: The Doubtful Validity of Victim-Specific Libel Laws

2007]

VICTIM-SPECIFIC LIBEL LAWS

cally crafted to meet the actual malice standard that would ordinarily
197
apply to such actions.
For all their good intentions and ostensible neutrality, however, these
laws do not entirely escape the concerns that gave rise to R.A.V's holding.
St. Paul's effort to advance an appealing purpose did not preclude the
Court's scrutiny of the ordinance's content-based restrictions.' 98 Here,
defamation of a particular class of persons-political candidates-is singled out for special adverse treatment by the state.' 9 9 It is tempting to
conclude that because false charges against candidates inflict great harm
on the political process, the rationale for defamation laws applies with
"special force" to this expression. Again, however, the reason for the existence of defamation laws is the protection of personal reputation. The
impetus behind campaign speech laws transcends the candidate's desire to
vindicate his good name. While this larger purpose may infuse the state's
interest with added weight, it also triggers a different calculus than the one
obtained when only private interests are at stake. The First Amendment
commitment to "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate on public issues 200 that produced the actual malice rule for public officials extends to
political campaigns as well. For that reason, speech in this context has
been accorded broad latitude. 201 In light of this countervailing consideration, special curbs on false political speech should not be deemed to meet
R.A. V's exception for restrictions rooted in the "very reason" that defamation is proscribable.
Nor can the effects produced by falsehoods about a candidate, however baleful, properly be considered "secondary." Indeed, they are direct
and primary. Unlike the increased crime and diminished property values
197. See, e.g.,
CAL. ELEc. CODE § 20501 (a) (requiring that violator have "willfully and knowingly" engaged in prohibited expression); MINN. STAT. § 211B.06
(requiring that violator know that prohibited communication was false or acted
with reckless disregard of whether communication was false).
198. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992) (endorsing ordinance's premise that "'[i]t is the responsibility, even the obligation, of diverse
communities to confront such notions [of racial supremacy] in whatever form they
appear'").
199. See id. at 379-80 (describing statute at issue).
200. See N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (emphasizing importance of First Amendment in context of political speech).
201. See Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 275 (1971) (stating that "[a]
community that imposed legal liability on all statements in a political campaign
deemed 'unreasonable' by a jury would have abandoned the First Amendment as
we know it"); see also Thomson Newspaper v. Coody, 896 S.W.2d 897, 903 (Ark.
1995) (stating that circumstantial evidence of ill-will was insufficient alone to establish actual malice); Desert Sun Pub. Co. v. Superior Ct., 158 Cal. Rptr. 519, 521
(Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (noting commitment to "'uninhibited, robust, and wideopen'" political comment); Valento v. Ulrich, 402 N.W.2d 809, 813 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1987) (illustrating difficult burden of proof for "actual malice" cases); Clark
v. Allen, 204 A.2d 42, 44 (Pa. 1964) (describing nature of political campaigns and
extent of "mudslinging" between opposing campaigns); Carr v. Brasher, 776
S.W.2d 567, 570 (Tex. 1989) (noting standard for actual malice).
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associated with the presence of "adult" theaters, 2° 2 the harms inflicted by
distortion of candidates' conduct and records do more than merely correlate with this type of expression. Similar to the anger and fear generated
by the fighting words that St. Paul sought to curb, 20 3 these harms-unfairness to the targeted candidate and corruption of the political process-are
the immediate consequence of that expression. Such damage may well
warrant special concern by the state, but it should not qualify special penalties for this species of libel for the second exception to R.A. V's bar
against selective bans on proscribable speech.
Admittedly, the non-partisan nature of laws forbidding libel of political candidates lends support to the conclusion that "there is no realistic
possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot." The potential impact
of campaign libel laws on the expression of ideas may be considered by
courts, however, just as the R.A. V Court explored the operational discrimination inherent in St. Paul's ordinance. 20 4 The danger that such laws
might enable the "suppression of ideas" is heightened when power to enforce them is reposed with an official agency. Allowing a governmental
body to act as the arbiter of truth in political speech may threaten fundamental First Amendment values.

In McKimm v. Ohio Elections Commis-

sion,20 5 for example, the court permitted the Ohio Elections Commission
to take action against a candidate for disseminating a cartoon that could
have been viewed as indicating that his opponent had accepted cash in
exchange for voting to award a construction contract. 20 6 If this action had
been brought as a private suit under general libel law, liability would have
20 7
hinged on ajury's finding that the cartoon conveyed this false assertion.
Although the reprimand issued to McKimm constituted fairly mild punishment, the rationale for upholding this action would not preclude a har20 8
sher sanction.
Moreover, even a statute confined to civil actions by individuals would
not inevitably qualify for R.A.V's catchall exception. If the statute authorized political opponents to bring causes of action or seek remedies not
available to similarly situated plaintiffs, it could still have the effect of
dampening political discourse. Any signal that the machinery of the
courts will respond with greater alacrity to politically inspired falsehoods
can foster the suppression of ideas, even if the particular ideas are not
202. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 4749 (1986)
(illustrating ordinance designed to pursue city's zoning interests as opposed to
suppress the expression of unpopular views").
203. See R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 392-93 (describing statute at issue).
204. For a further discussion of the Court's decision in RA. V., see supra notes
21-24 and accompanying text.
205. 729 N.E.2d 364 (Ohio 2000).
206. See id. at 368.
207. See generally Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
208. See McKimm, 729 N.E.2d at 368 (receiving letter of reprimand as opposed
to prosecution).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol52/iss3/4

30

Stern: The Doubtful Validity of Victim-Specific Libel Laws

2007]

VICTIM-SPECIFIC LIBEL LAWS

identified in advance. 209 Moreover, the ability to bring or credibly
threaten suit may enhance the already formidable arsenal of better financed candidates.
It can be plausibly argued, of course, that even when subjected to
strict scrutiny, statutes that single out libel of political candidates for
heightened penalty pass muster because they are narrowly tailored to
achieve the state's compelling interest in promoting an accurately informed electorate. This position derives some support from the Supreme
Court's decision in McConnell v. IEC2 1° upholding restrictions on certain
types of campaign advertisements. Specifically, the Court sustained a ban
on the contribution of non-federal funds to state and local party committees for "any 'public communication' that 'refers to a clearly identified
candidate for Federal office' and 'promotes,' 'supports,' 'attacks,' or 'opposes' a candidate for that office. ' 2 11 Still, the two cases are not identical.
The BCRA ban on funding for "sham issue advertising" 2 12 was based on
extensive experience with the corrosive effects of such advertising on the
political process. 21 3 Moreover, because the restriction was framed as a
limitation on campaign contributions, the Court applied only "closely
drawn" scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny. 21 4 Thus, even if some version
of a special libel law for political candidates could survive strict scrutiny, it
must be grounded in ample findings and more finely crafted than current
215
categorical provisions to fall under McConnell's rationale.
C.

Impugning Women's Chastity

One type of statute that almost certainly fails constitutional scrutiny is
a law singling out for punishment or liability falsehoods that impugn the
chastity of women. Such statutes survive in a number of states. 2 16 Yet,
they fall squarely within R.A.V's ban on content-based discrimination
209. Cf United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 110 (1947) ("Popular
government, to be effective, must permit and encourage much wider political activity by all the people. Real popular government means 'that men may speak as
they think on matters vital to them and that falsehoods may be exposed through
the processes of education and discussion."') (citation omitted).
210. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
211. Id. at 162 (citation omitted).
212. See id. at 185.
213. See id. at 126-29, 185.
214. See id. at 134-42.
215. A legislature might document, for example, that certain kinds of misrepresentations about a candidate made close to an election tend to have such heightened credibility that normal means of responding cannot redress their deleterious
impact on the campaign.
216. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 836.04 (2007); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 779 (2006)
(describing crime of"falsely and maliciously or falsely and wantonly imput[ing] to
any female ...

a want of chastity"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-75-10 (2006); UTAH CODE

ANN. § 76-9-507 (2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-417 (2004) (treating as misdemeanor false statements "derogatory of [a chaste] female's character for virtue and
chastity").
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within a proscribable category. Nor can they be rationalized as falling
within one of R.A.V's exceptions. An argument that the reason for defamation's ineligibility for First Amendment protection applies with special
force to falsely accusing women of unchastity would make that exception
virtually circular and limitless. Likewise, characterizing the adverse impact
of such expression as a secondary effect would vastly enlarge this exception, for the harms that flow from false charges of female unchastity are
indistinguishable in kind from the consequences of other derogatory falsehoods. Finally, these laws cannot plausibly be said to meet the catchall
exception. On the contrary, by enforcing the notion that women's virtue
is more precious than men's, they fly in the face of R.A.V's prohibition of
21 7
laws that effectively discriminate by viewpoint.
Indeed, given these statutes' express reference to gender, they probably also violate equal protection because of the heightened scrutiny that
the Court applies to this type of classification. 2 18 Under the Court's analysis, the fact that a law confers an advantage on women rather than men is
irrelevant. 2 19 Thus, one state supreme court has already found its state's
chastity law in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 220 The likely invalidity under equal protection of statutes safeguarding only women's reputation for chastity, however, does not render First Amendment
consideration of these laws irrelevant. Rather, it sheds light on the more
broadly suspect nature of victim-specific defamation laws. Selective libel
laws can distort communication by their disparate treatment of different
classes of persons just as restrictions on access to a limited public forum
can implicate principles at the intersection of equal protection and free
speech. 22 1 In the case of laws forbidding false accusations of female un217. See Calvin R. Massey, Hate Speech, Cultural Diversity, and the Foundational
Paradigmsof Free Expression, 40 UCLA L. REv. 103, 179 (1992) (stating that R.A.V.
"mak[es] it plain that, even within the traditional categories, content-based regulation that has as its object the suppression of ideas is impermissible").
218. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-34 (1996) (establishing
intermediate scrutiny for gender-based classifications).
219. See generally Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (invalidating exclusion of men from state-supported co-educational nursing program);
Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (striking down law authorizing imposition of alimony obligation only on husbands); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 190 (1976)
(finding law allowing females, but not males, between ages eighteen and twenty to
purchase "nonintoxicating" beer violative of equal protection).
220. See Butler v. Town of Argo, 871 So. 2d 1, 17 (Ala. 2003) (holding that
chastity statute violated Constitution); Ivey v. State, 821 So. 2d 937, 945 (Ala.
2001). Another court has upheld its state's statute authorizing suits for falsely imputing unchastity to a woman. See generally Wardlaw v. Peck, 318 S.E.2d 270 (S.C.
Ct. App. 1984). The court's decision, however, was expressly premised on the defendant's failure to show that a cause of action would not also be available for a
false imputation of unchastity to a man. See id. at 278.
221. See Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95, 99-102 (1972) (striking
down ban on limitation on picketing near schools to picketing involving labor issues under Equal Protection Clause while also invoking First Amendment principle that "government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its
ideas, its subject matter, or its content").
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chastity, a twofold effect can be discerned. On the one hand, making aspersions on only female virtue worthy of penalty restricts speech in the
service of the idea of women's superior character. 2 22 On the other hand,
such laws tend to promote confining stereotypes by limiting the range of
appropriate behavior for women. 2 23 Equal protection doctrine has acknowledged that laws that classify by gender may "in practical effect, put
women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage." 224 For example, Mississippi's
policy of admitting only women to a state university nursing school obviously discriminated again men. 225 In striking down this policy, however,
the Court also recognized that the policy harmed women by
"perpetuat[ing] the stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively woman's
226
job" to the detriment of nurses' wages.
While victim-specific libel laws not involving suspect or quasi-suspect
classifications will rarely violate the Equal Protection Clause, such laws may
present some of the same problems highlighted by statutes concerning
female unchastity. The premise that one group's reputation is especially
vulnerable or important often implies that a comparable group's is less so.
At the same time, even the ostensibly protected class may suffer from the
tacit premise that its members are expected to adhere to a higher standard
of conduct. In the context of an action on behalf of the favored group,
the justice of vindicating the besmirched reputation of the victim may obscure the injustice of the disparity in protection. The lapse in evenhandedness may thus seem innocuous in the immediate case, but R.A.V
warns against the dangers of selectivity. Whatever the merits of such laws
under equal protection analysis, then, R.A.V counsels searching scrutiny
for subtler versions of the egregious flaws that mar statutes on female
unchastity.

D.

Defamation of AgriculturalProducers

A final type of troubling victim-specific statute is illustrated by North
Dakota's provision for civil liability for defamation of agricultural products. Under this statute, someone who "willfully or purposefully disseminates a false and defamatory statement. . . regarding an agricultural
producer or an agricultural product under circumstances in which... the
agricultural producer is [foreseeably] damaged as a result" may be as222. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992) (rejecting asjustification for St. Paul's hate speech ordinance purpose of combating "messages ...
'based on virulent notions of racial supremacy,").
223. Cf Kenneth L. Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DuKE LJ. 447, 458
(1984) (pointing to statutory rape laws as example of how "[elven laws with a protective appearance might serve the ends of male control over female sexuality").
224. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
225. See generally Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (holding Mississippi's policy unconstitutional).

226. See id. at 729-30, 730 n.15 (noting negative aspects towards women of sex
classification that discriminated against men).
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sessed both compensatory and exemplary damages. 227 In addition, if the
defendant is found to have "maliciously disseminated" such a statement,
the plaintiff "may recover.., three times the actual damages proven" and
is further entitled to "recover costs, disbursements, and actual reasonable
attorney's fees incurred" in the suit.228 Admittedly, the state has an obvious interest in curbing false statements about agricultural products. Indeed, a broader cause of action for false or misleading disparagement of
229
products is well-established in state and federal law.
Nevertheless, this kind of law raises some of the concerns that other
victim-specific defamation laws should arouse. The statute's frankly
heightened solicitude for a particular type of commercial plaintiff evokes
suspicion that libel law is being exploited to advance an economic agenda.
It is understandable that most North Dakotans would object to the dissemination of false information about an important industry, but "[t] he point
of the First Amendment is that majority preferences must be expressed in
some fashion other than silencing speech on its content."2 30 While the
preference in this case presumably springs from economic rather than ideological motives, its embodiment in libel law nevertheless threatens to
skew the landscape of expression. The class of "agricultural producer"
that can recover special damages and costs under the statute potentially
encompasses a significant category of persons and businesses. Laws of this
sort can dampen criticism of the favored group without imposing comparable inhibitions on the group's own participation in public debate. It is
not difficult to envision the proliferation of special-interest libel laws that
deter criticism of influential industries by consumer advocates and others,
while leaving those industries a relatively free hand to present their case.
Yet, under RA.V, government is not permitted "to license one side of a
debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of
2 31
Queensbury rules."
227. N.D. CENrT. CODE § 32-44-02 (2005).
228. Id.
229. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000) (commonly referred to as section 43(a) of
Lanham Act); Skil Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777, 783-85 (N.D. Ill.
1974) (explaining elements of cause of action under section 43(a)). See generally
Paul T. Hayden, A Goodly Apple Rotten at the Heart: Commercial Disparagementin ComparativeAdvertising as Common-Law Tortious Unfair Competition, 76 IowA L. REv. 67
(1990).
230. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992) (emphasizing that,
although St. Paul desired to communicate message to minority groups that "group
hatred" aspect of certain "fighting words" was not condoned by majority of citizens,
such goal could not be accomplished simply by silencing unpopular speech).
231. See id. at 391-92 (noting that St. Paul's statute allowed side favoring "racial, color, etc., tolerance and equality" the ability to display such position, but
forbade opposing side to do so). A glimpse of the danger posed by economically
partisan libel laws like North Dakota's can be found in a suit brought by Texas
cattlemen a few years ago against the talk-show host Oprah Winfrey. The suit was
brought under Texas's False Disparagement of Perishable Food Products Act,
which created liability for disseminating information that falsely "'states or implies
that the perishable food product is not safe for consumption by the public.'" See
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CONCLUSION

It would be hyperbole to contend that victim-specific libel laws currently pose a major threat to free expression. Still, the Court has recog-

nized that apparently small encroachments on speech can implicate
important First Amendment principles. 232 One of those principles, reaffirmed in R.A.V., is that disparate treatment even of otherwise unprotected
speech endangers goals and values embodied by the free speech guarantee. Laws that single out and penalize the defamation of certain individuals undermine the idea that government may not discriminate within a
category of expression. These laws should be subjected to close scrutiny so
they do not flourish into a patchwork of preferred causes of action for
favored groups. R.A. V's warning against "selective limitations upon
speech," 233 invoked to strike down an ordinance addressed to the narrow
category of fighting words, should apply at least as vigorously to the robust
area of libel.
Tex. Beef Group v. Winfrey, 11 F. Supp. 2d 858, 862 (N.D. Tex. 1998), affd, 201
F.3d 680 (5th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). The suit arose from a broadcast of The
Oprah Winfrey Show examining the link between the consumption of beef and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE, or "Mad Cow Disease"). See id. at 861. The
plaintiffs charged that the program was "nothing more than a 'scary story,"' falsely
suggesting that U.S. beef is highly dangerous because of Mad Cow Disease and that
a horrible epidemic worse than Aids [sic] could occur from eating U.S. beef."' See
id. at 862. The allegations against Winfrey and her guest were ultimately dismissed
because the guest was found not to have made any provably false assertions. See id.
at 863. Still, such suits and their potential chilling effect can only be encouraged
by the existence of statutes like North Dakota's § 32-44-02.
232. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 15 (1971) (noting that case
involving display of profanity on jacket "may seem at first blush too inconsequential to find its way into our books, but the issue it presents is of no small constitutional significance").
233. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 392.
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